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클라우드 환경에서 수사 실무와 법적 과제
Practical and Legal Challenges of Cloud Investigations 
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요  약 클라우드 컴퓨팅 서비스의 확산으로 범죄수사를 위한 증거수집의 관점에서 불확실성으로 인한 다양한 실무적이
고 법적인 문제가 제기되고 있다. 이 논문은 클라우드 환경에 대한 일반적인 수사상의 논점을 개관하고, 관할과 국제공
조를 비롯한 문제점을 진단한다. 실무적으로 직접적으로 수사관이 접속하는 경우와 서비스제공자의 협조를 받는 경우의 
장단점을 비교하여 실무적 개선방안을 논의하고 이에 따른 관할의 중복과 서비스 약정 및 포렌식적으로 무결한 데이터 
수집 등 법률적 쟁점을 정리한다. 
Abstract  An area presenting new opportunities for both legitimate business, as well as criminal organizations, is 
Cloud computing. This work gives a strong background in current digital forensic science, as well as a basic 
understanding of the goal of Law Enforcement when conducting digital forensic investigations. These concepts are 
then applied to digital forensic investigation of cloud environments in both theory and practice, and supplemented 
with current literature on the subject. Finally, legal challenges with digital forensic investigations in cloud 
environments are discussed. 
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Ⅰ. Cloud Computing and Digital 
Forensic Investigation
As more businesses and end-users adopt 
technologies that utilize cloud technologies[1], criminals 
too begin to use and exploit such technologies. Because 
of the complexity in setup, usage, hosting and even 
location of cloud services, digital forensic investigation 
of such technologies can be challenging. A number of 
prior works have looked at the challenges of extracting 
digital evidence from cloud environments [2][3], in this 
work we will provide an overview of the state of Cloud 
investigation practice and theory and describe legal 
challenges that are commonly observed by Law 
Enforcement.
The job of police officers - digital forensic 
investigators - is normally to conduct an impartial 
investigation, and provide an unbiased report on the 
discovered facts – both inculpatory and exculpatory – 
that are relevant to the probandum. Discovered facts 
Practical and Legal Challenges of Cloud Investigations 
- 34 -
can be submitted as evidence, which are then tested by 
the courts to determine if the evidence is admissible. 
Evidence from digital forensic investigations is 
considered scientific, like other forensic sciences, and 
therefore can be tested against the requirements for the 
admittance of scientific evidence. Assuming the 
evidence is admitted in court, a jury then compares the 
observed chain of events to the probandum, and guilt 
or innocence is determined. 
Digital evidence is defined as “[i]nformation of 
probative value that is stored or transmitted in binary 
form”.[4] There are two states of data that digital 
forensic investigators must work with: live data and 
persistent (post-mortem) data. Live data is data in a 
system that is powered on (like in the case of Cloud 
hosts and instances), and is more prone to change. 
Persistent data is data available when the system has 
been shut down. It must be said that all data has a 
degree of volatility, or susceptibility to change, and the 
speed in which data is likely to change, ordered from 
fastest to slowest, is known as the Order of Volatility 
(OoV). 
Digital investigators must consider the implications 
of collecting each type of data, and be able to prioritize 
the data by the order of volatility. The order of 
volatility, and even availability of data, differs between 
a live system and an offline system. A number of prior 
works have discussed specific challenges with the 
collection, verification and preservation of digital 
evidence from Cloud environments.[5][6]
Sources of digital evidence are dependent on the 
current state of the suspect system. For example, if a 
suspect’s system is live, data from RAM may be 
accessible. This data could possibly hold information 
that could be used as inculpatory or exculpatory 
evidence, but would not be available if the system was 
powered down. While computer systems are common 
sources of digital evidence, other digital devices, such 
as cellular phones, are becoming just, if not more, 
common.
Ⅱ. Digital Forensic Investigation in 
Cloud Environments 
New concepts in cloud computing have created new 
challenges for security teams and researchers alike. 
Cloud computing service and deployment models have 
a number of potential benefits for businesses and 
customers, but security and investigation challenges – 
some inherited from ‘traditional’ computing, and some 
unique to cloud computing – create uncertainty and 
potential for abuse as cloud technologies proliferate. 
1. Cloud Computing and Investigation Challenges 
A 2013 survey [7] of 106 participants identified the 
main challenges of cloud investigation as: 
 a. Jurisdiction 
 b. Lack of international collaboration and    
legislative mechanism in cross-nation data access 
and exchange 
 c. Lack of law/regulation and law advisory 
 d. Simple role management (e.g., admin, user) 
makes it difficult to categorize suspects 
 e. Investigating external chain of dependencies of 
the cloud provider (e.g., a cloud provider can use 
the service from another provider) 
 f. Decreased access to and control over forensic 
data at all levels from customer side 
 g. Exponential increase of digital (mobile) devices 
accessing the cloud 
Many of the technologies that make up cloud 
services, such as virtualization, have existed since 
before the utility computing business model was 
practical on a large scale. Because infrastructure, 
platform and software hosting technologies have 
existed for business and personal use for some time, 
techniques for digital investigation of incidents relating 
to these technologies may be well known. For example, 
forensic acquisition and verification of hard drives is a 
common task in digital forensic investigations. Many 
times the same acquisition methods for a physical disk 
may also work for virtual disks associated with a 
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virtual machine. Many of the digital forensic 
acquisition, verification and analysis techniques may be 
able to be applied to cloud investigations, but cloud 
does pose some new challenges for digital forensic 
investigators. The following are a few of the many 
potential challenges cloud computing brings to digital 
investigation. 
In traditional investigations the suspect or victim’s 
computers may normally be the main source of 
information about an incident. For example, in a child 
exploitation case, a suspect may have stored illicit 
images on their local hard drive. By finding and 
analyzing the images, the investigator may be able to 
determine that the images were, in fact, illegal. Other 
information, such as the recently opened files list, may 
be used to support that the suspect had knowledge of 
the images. However, if the suspect is using 
cloud-based storage, the images may not be stored 
locally. In this case, the investigator may be able to 
show that the suspect had knowledge of the images, 
but not whether the images were actually illegal. 
Saliba(2012) claims that cloud services may reduce the 
amount of direct evidence available on a suspect’s dis
k[8], but sometimes provide more information about the 
user and cloud service that would help in acquiring a 
subpoena or warrant. As more data is stored in the 
cloud, and services reduce the client-side impact, fewer 
evidential traces may be found. 
When suspect data is stored in the cloud the data 
may be in one jurisdiction while the suspect machine 
connecting to the service may be in another 
jurisdiction. This scenario is becoming a challenge for 
Law Enforcement in many countries, especially with 
mobile cloud-attached devices. In many countries, 
investigators may access data stored remotely if given 
permission by the suspect (verbal conformation, 
entering the password, etc.). However, there has been 
very little definition of what to do if data is stored on 
a non-national cloud service that is currently connected 
while the investigator begins a live analysis of the 
suspect system. If the data is accessible, an 
investigator may save a considerable amount of time 
by acquiring the data from the connected service rather 
than waiting for international requests. But authority 
on this matter is not always clear. A lack of definition 
on the scope of acquisition of data on non-national 
remote connections sometimes depends on the country, 
and many times depends on the investigator’s 
preliminary analysis of the remotely stored data as well 
as the likelihood of receiving the data if an international 
request was made. 
Investigators physically accessing the CSP may also 
be more difficult, and may be impossible if the data is 
distributed over several geographic locations.[9] In 
traditional investigations, a computer or server may 
possibly be taken down, and its physical disks imaged. 
Taking down production servers is increasingly rare 
for server environments since law enforcement may be 
liable for damages while the server is down. Taking 
servers down in a cloud environment may have an 
impact on many customers, creating more liability. 
Further, data may be stored on virtual storage 
spanning multiple servers, or even geographic 
locations, meaning that hard disk acquisition may not 
be practical, or even produce the desired data. Liability 
and reconstruction of virtual storage in cloud 
environments from physical disk images remains a 
challenge. 
Storage in the cloud is attractive to users because it 
is highly accessible and relatively inexpensive. As 
previously mentioned, the amount of data on personal 
hard drives is becoming too large for most law 
enforcement agencies to acquire and store all the data. 
Cloud services, however, are currently offering 
Gigabytes of space for free with the option to pay for 
more storage. The amount of stored data could quickly 
add up across multiple cloud service offerings. 
Resulting again in too much data for law enforcement 
to process and store. 
Since acquisition of a whole physical disk may not 
be practical or possible, and the quantity of data may 
be too large to effectively process and store, selective 
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data acquisition may be required. Selective data 
acquisition implies a preliminary analysis, or some prior 
knowledge, to reduce the overall dataset an investigator 
is interested in. The challenge with this method is an 
intrinsic challenge in digital forensic investigations; 
how do we know what we don’t know? In other words, 
even if all possible data could be acquired, how do we 
know that no evidence has been missed? If this 
question cannot be easily answered when all data is 
available, how can an investigator justify reducing the 
dataset, and potentially excluding inculpatory and/or 
exculpatory evidence? Some investigators are currently 
focusing on data sources that they believe are likely to 
provide the richest sources of information, but 
justifiable exclusion remains a challenge. 
Because of the distributed, multi-layered nature of 
cloud computing, chain of custody for the data may be 
impossible to verify. Without strict controls it may be 
impossible to determine where exactly the data was 
stored, who had access, and was leakage or 
contamination of data possible. If data is stored in a 
cloud where multiple users and CSPs potentially have 
access, association of the data to the suspect is a 
challenge to establish beyond a reasonable doubt. 
When an incident occurs on the side of the CSP, the 
CSP may be more concerned with restoring service 
than with preserving evidence. Further, the CSP may 
begin its own investigation into an incident without 
taking proper precautions to ensure the integrity of 
potential evidence. In more severe cases, CSPs may not 
report or cooperate in investigation of incidents for fear 
of reputational damage. The challenge in this case is 
with the competence and trustworthiness of the CSP. A 
CSP would be an effective, immediate first-responder, 
but questions about the integrity and chain of custody 
of the acquired evidence may make admissibility 
difficult. To meet this challenge law enforcement 
should work with CSPs, and ensure proper 
documentation is being created and forensically sound 
processes are being used. 
Another challenge is with feature of rapid elasticity 
in cloud environments. Data associated with newly 
created virtual machine instances may only be available 
for a limited time. To this author’s knowledge, no 
research has been conducted on determining available 
data associated with removed VM instances. If a new 
VM instance is created and either compromised or used 
to attack, evidential traces may be available in the VM. 
If the VM instance is then deallocated, investigators 
currently do not know whether evidential traces, or the 
entire VM instance cloud be recovered. 
The final challenge in this non-comprehensive list is 
the issue of international communication. As mentioned 
previously, cloud computing blurs physical, policy and 
jurisdictional boundaries globally. However, law 
enforcement at a global level has yet to find effective, 
timely and efficient international communication and 
cooperation channels. Conferences such as the 
International Symposium on Cybercrime Response 
specifically discuss international law enforcement 
communication and collaboration efforts. Such 
conferences allow law enforcement to create informal 
communication channels, and sometimes help in the 
creation of bilateral agreements for cooperation, but 
these channels have their limits. 
Global law enforcement communication channels, 
such as INTERPOL’s I-24/7 network or the G8 24/7 
network, connect many countries, but are limited by 
their structure and bureaucracy. Many officers have 
found the global networks to be somewhat effective if 
the request was not overly urgent, however, these 
networks have failed to address real-time requests for 
help from countries under DDoS attack. Many times, 
law enforcement will prefer faster, informal channels to 
begin an international investigation, rather that 
traversing such networks. However, multi-country 
operations, such as ‘Operation Unmask’, show the 
potential of these networks to assist in large-scale 
coordination efforts. Overall, users, businesses and 
even criminals are utilizing technologies, such as cloud 
computing, to be able to rapidly find and share (and 
exploit) new ideas. These groups are no longer 
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considering physical and political borders. Law 
enforcement, however, is currently restricted by a lack 
of effective global communication channels, political 
issues, and jurisdiction that make policing in a globally 
connected world even more of a challenge.
Ⅲ. Cloud Forensics in Practice 
In practice, digital investigations in cloud environments 
are taking place largely as before. When attempting to 
access evidential traces on cloud-connected devices, 
‘traditional’ digital forensic investigation methods can 
be employed, such as computer or mobile device 
analysis. The greater challenge lies in the fact that a 
large amount of data only be available in the Cloud. In 
practice there are essentially two options that 
investigators have to access data stored in the Cloud. 
They can either attempt to access the data themselves 
through user authentication methods, or work with the 
Cloud Service Provider to collect data. 
Normally, attempting to access the data directly is 
preferred because it is much faster than making formal 
requests. Further, there is no guarantee that a CSP will 
comply with a request for data, especially if the CSP is 
outside of the jurisdiction of the investigator making 
the request. 
Many times, however, the local device, such as the 
suspect’s computer or phone will contain authentication 
data that may allow the investigator to access data 
stored on the cloud. There is also the possibility that 
the suspect willingly supplies such credentials. If the 
investigator can get access to suspect data stored in 
the Cloud, the cloud service will determine whether the 
investigator can use standard forensic acquisition tools 
(Dykstra and Sherman 2012).[10] 
For example, investigators may access cloud-based 
storage and attempt to acquire suspect data directly 
from the logical device. In many cases, an investigator 
may be forced to used the interface provided by the 
CSP. Forensic file copying is preferred over acquiring 
an image of the logical volume, even though 
investigators may not always understand when (and 
how) file content and meta- data are modified by the 
cloud service. Acquisition of a physical disk that is part 
of a cloud environment is rarely, if ever, done because 
of the size of physical and reconstructing data is not 
always feasible. 
If the investigator cannot access the data directly – 
either technically or legally – then participation from 
the Cloud Service Provider may be necessary. In this 
case, the type of data that the CSP can, or is willing 
to, provide the investigator will depend on a number of 
factors including the CSP’s internal policies, jurisdiction 
and general attitude toward the investigator/case. If 
data is provided it could be anything from logs relating 
to the suspect to file content. Again, the type, quality 
and quantity of available data can vary greatly between 
CSP. 
1. Opportunities for Digital Investigations 
in Cloud Environments 
Ruan, Carthy et al. (2011) also identified a number of 
potential opportunities that cloud environments bring to 
digital forensic investigations.[11] The first is an 
improvement of cost effectiveness when implementing 
‘forensic services’ on a large scale. In this case, it is 
assumed that forensic services that are 
processing-intensive can also using cloud 
infrastructure to deploy forensic services and offer 
such services to the masses. 
The next opportunity is the possibility of a greater 
amount of data being made available to an investigator. 
Multiple copies of data may be stored in a cloud 
service. If one copy is deleted, damaged or otherwise 
altered an investigator may be able to access backup 
copies of the data. Further, cloud services often include 
comprehensive logs of transactions, which may also 
help in investigations. Further, cloud services may help 
investigations with processing and data validation since 
cloud services normally integrate data validation, and 
are tuned for data processing tasks. 
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Ⅳ. Legal Challenges Relating to 
Cloud Investigations 
Commonly discussed legal concerns with cloud 
investigations include issues with jurisdiction, 
international law and cooperation; Service Level 
Agreements; and forensic data collection. 
1. Multiple Jurisdictions 
Jurisdiction is a concern in cloud environments 
because a CSP may be located in several different legal 
jurisdictions. The data, then, may be subject to multiple 
legal considerations at the same time. The situation is 
made even more complex when one CSP is using 
services from another CSP that may be located in 
separate jurisdictions. 
An investigator may not have legal authority to 
acquire data that is outside of their jurisdiction, even if 
that data can be easily accessed. Multiple jurisdictions 
normally mean that an investigator will need to make 
a mutual legal assistance request for data, which will 
be forwarded to an agent in the jurisdiction of interest 
for processing. Formal mutual legal assistance requests 
normally take a long time. This combined with the time 
the CSP may take to respond to the request could mean 
months until the investigator receives data, if at all. 
Overall, data resident in multiple jurisdictions is a 
challenge because of politics. International cooperation 
in digital investigations works, but not well. Some 
regions work better with each other than others. 
Challenges are mostly due to communication and 
sovereignty issues that result in long delays or no 
response to requests. Technically multiple jurisdictions 
pose few new challenges since cloud services are 
hyper-connected, it is technically easy to transfer data. 
However, it is difficult for an investigator to get the 
authority to do so in another jurisdiction. 
2. Service Level Agreements 
The need for establishing Service Level Agreements 
(SLA) considering digital investigations and security in 
cloud environments has been widely discussed. In 
many of these works, the authors claim the SLA 
should, most of all, focus on who is responsible for 
which security/ investigation/ information sharing 
tasks, and when and how these tasks should be carried 
out. The SLA should also ensure that the CSP can 
comply with applicable regulations and industry 
standards. The customer should be made aware of 
which laws (which jurisdiction) govern the SLA. 
3. Forensic Data Collection 
Forensic data collection is another legal challenge 
relating to the acceptance of digital evidence in court. 
An investigator should be able to verify the data they 
are basing any conclusions on accurately represents the 
suspect’s original data. The difficulty for investigators 
is understanding how digital evidence can potentially 
change based on the service that was used. For 
example files stored with Amazon and Google cloud 
services may alter timestamps, or even file content, 
differently. Beyond the services, it is not always clear 
how forensic tools will alter data stored on these 
services. Research is currently looking into these 
questions, but it is difficult when so many different 
cloud offerings exist with potentially different 
standards. 
Another challenge related to forensic data collection 
is the challenge of evidence segregation. Cloud services 
potentially create a large amount of data. However, 
data, such as logs, may contain information about 
multiple users. Further, if infrastructure is shared 
between multiple users, it is difficult to segregate data 
for a user of interest. 
Finally, external dependency chains further 
complicate the issue of trust in the CSP to accurately 
represent collected data. CSPs and their dependents 
should be able to demonstrate that integrity has been 
maintained, but ultimately investigators, and the legal 
system in general, will have to accept some level of 
risk associated with CSP and their dependents 
providing data that will be used as evidence. 
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Ⅴ. Conclusions 
Digital forensic investigations of cloud environments 
is a complicated topic that covers technical, 
organizational and legal considerations. While digital 
forensic investigations are taking place in cloud 
environments using traditional investigation methods, 
there are still many questions. These questions will 
evolve as cloud computing continues to evolve, 
however, the legal challenges will largely remain the 
same. Namely, the question of jurisdiction and 
international cooperation.
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